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RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE PUBLIC




The problem of religious expression in the public square is not
primarily legal in a narrow sense. We are not talking about whether
people are allowed to voice certain kinds of opinions or to vote on
certain kinds of grounds.' The problem is about how citizens and
officials in liberal democracies should act. My own position on this
problem is an intermediate one, in a sense I shall shortly explain. Its
plausibility depends on some sense of the strengths and weaknesses
of positions at each end of the spectrum. I shall begin with a
thumbnail sketch of these.
II. INCLUSIVE AND EXCLUSIVE POSITIONS
What we may call the inclusive position is as follows. People
have all sorts of grounds for making personal and political judgments.
Perhaps none of these are favored in liberal democracies; in any event
religious convictions and practices are certainly not disfavored.
People cannot easily distinguish their personal lives from their
political lives, their cultural participation from their political participa-
tion. For most religious persons, these are interwoven together. No
one supposes that religion is off limits as a basis for personal choice
or as a strand of cultural understanding and criticism. If this is
t This Essay summarizes ideas developed by Professor Greenawalt in his most recent
book, KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995).
Readers who are interested in a more thorough analysis and in citations to proponents of
various views will find them in this book.
* University Professor, Columbia University School of Law; A.B., Swarthmore
College, 1958; B. Phil., Oxford University, 1960; LL.B., Columbia, 1963. This Essay is a
written draft of remarks given by Professor Greenawalt at the Association of American
Law Schools Annual Meeting, San Antonio, Texas, January 1996.
1. Although the problem is not primarily legal, an answer to it might bear on whether
some motivations render laws unconstitutional.
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granted, religion is not off limits as a foundation for political
participation. The inclusive position resonates with the values of the
free exercise of religion.
The most basic premises of postmodern, critical perspectives lend
support to this position. They, of course, do not endorse any view
that some religious understandings are genuinely timeless and
transcendent; but they do bolster a view that no favored, neutral,
discourse exists. If all discourses reflect human power and time-
bound aspirations, why should religious convictions be treated
differently from any other?
The exclusive position starts with ideas of fairness and social
harmony in liberal democracies. In societies in which citizens are
equal and largely free to pursue their own ideals and desires, coercing
one citizen because of the religious views of other citizens is unfair,
and will breed resentment and conflict. Religion is fine for personal
life and cultural understanding, but religious beliefs are unacceptable
grounds for governmental coercion. The appropriate grounds are
basic premises of liberal democracy, such as the equality of citizens,
and shared methods of understanding, such as ordinary scientific
techniques. People respect each other's equality and liberty by
adopting coercive measures only when they rest on grounds that the
people coerced should reasonably accept as valid. This does not
mean the people coerced should reasonably accept that, on balance,
coercion is warranted, but they should realize that the bases for
coercion have some force for them.
Exactly what views are excluded, or self-excluded, by the
exclusive position varies. Three major possibilities are (1) all religious
views; (2) all comprehensive views;2 and (3) all views that are not
publicly-or rationally-accessible to citizens in general? With some
oversimplification, we can say that religious views are likely to be
excluded under any of these approaches, and that what mainly varies
is what else is excluded. The exclusive position bears some resem-
blance to the Establishment Clause, with its idea that religion and
government should not mix.
If you are like me, you will find something strongly attractive in
each of the two basic positions. The attractions of one are an
obstacle to wholesale acceptance of the other. Once we begin to
2. This treats nonreligious overarching views of life like religious views.
3. Public accessibility concerns the force of grounds, not just the percentage of
citizens who happen to accept them.
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examine matters more closely, we begin to doubt that one answer is
right for all liberal democracies. We also see that the strength of the
arguments for the two basic positions varies with different sorts of
people and different aspects of participation in political life. From
these insights come the seeds of a nuanced, defensible, not wholly
satisfactory intermediate position for the United States at the end of
the twentieth century.
III. IMPOSITIONS, DEGREES OF SELF-EXCLUSION,
RELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS
Before I turn to that position, I need to clarify some preliminary
matters.
A. Impositions
First, I want to narrow the focus of discussion. Some political
outcomes are themselves at odds with values of liberal democracy, or
of our liberal democracy. Let us assume, although this remains
controversial, that devotional bible reading led by teachers in ordinary
public school classes involves an unacceptable imposition of religion.
An atheist could support such bible reading on nonreligious
grounds-say that it helps quiet students at the beginning of the day,
or has the paradoxical consequence of showing them how ridiculous
traditional Christianity and Judaism are. But virtually all supporters
of devotional bible reading are moved by religious reasons. This
illustration is not helpful for considering the use of religious reasons
in politics, because it mixes up concerns about the nature of underly-
ing grounds with concerns about the narrower effects of the practice.
If promoting religion in public schools is itself unacceptable, the
example is a poor test of whether, in general, underlying religious
grounds belong in political discourse.
Consider legislation to regulate laboratory use of animals-to
assure humane conditions and to provide that experiments in which
animals will predictably die are not performed unless they serve a
substantial human need. If such legislation would modestly increase
the cost of laboratory experimentation and would preclude lethal
testing for marginal purposes, the law would not impose religion on
anyone, at least it would not impose religion in any ordinary sense.
Yet, citizens and officials might formulate positions based on their
religious understandings of what animals deserve. This is the kind of
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use of religious grounds that is genuinely disputed; it is the kind of
use on which I am focussing.
B. Degrees of Exclusion
Self-exclusion of religious grounds in politics might be total or
partial along three different dimensions. First, all or only some
people might have a responsibility to exclude. Along this dimension,
the basic division is between officials and ordinary citizens; but among
officials, judges might be different from legislators, and among
citizens, ordinary citizens might be different from religious leaders or
from presidents of major universities. The second dimension is
between bases on which one actually decides and one's stated reasons
for a position. Total exclusion would require that someone both
decide on nonreligious reasons and discuss and defend her decisions
in those terms. Partial exclusion would permit either decision or
articulation in religious terms, but not both. The third dimension is
a bit harder to explain. One might think it is all right for people to
rely on deep fundamental religious assumptions, such as that God
loves all human beings equally, but not to rely on narrower, more
specific religious grounds, such as the Pope's explanation of how
natural law precludes artificial contraception and abortion. In what
follows, I will disregard this third dimension, partly because it is so
difficult to come up with any satisfactory division and, more funda-
mentally, because I am skeptical that such a division is appropriate in
our society.
C. Originating Standpoints for Political Philosophy
My third preliminary matter is of fundamental importance. I
often face this challenge:
What is the point of talking about the responsibilities of
citizens in a liberal democracy floating free of people's
distinctive religious views? Religion encompasses all of life.
No seriously religious person faces any issue without regard
to his religious understanding. Conceivably, someone might
conclude that a religious belief important for personal life
should not be employed for political coercion; but he would
reach that conclusion only by reference to his overarching
religious position. Why develop principles of political
philosophy that do not depend on a religious or other
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comprehensive view? The only significant evaluation must
take place within a comprehensive view.
4
This is a complex problem. There is a form of political philoso-
phy, practiced notably by John Rawls and Bruce Ackerman, that
draws from premises of liberal democracy and characteristics of
human beings to develop social principles, without resolving
overarching questions about the meaning of human life. Another
form of political philosophy begins with some overarching view and
works downward to political institutions and social justice. Thomas
Aquinas and Jeremy Bentham were practitioners of this approach.
Some people, as Rawls points out, accept political principles without
any clear sense of their relation to an overarching position; but if an
approach to political philosophy is to affect many people, it must
connect to the religious and other comprehensive positions people
hold. Is this a realistic expectation for any philosophy that does not
itself start from a comprehensive position?
Let us return first to how our problem of religion and politics
might be viewed from a comprehensive position. A person's religion
might lead her to believe in human liberty and equality. She might
determine that if these are to be respected, people should be coerced
only on grounds accessible to them, and further, that her own faith-
based religious understanding is not accessible in the right way to
nonbelievers. She might then be open, from the standpoint of her
own religious understanding, to the proposal that religious grounds
should not play a direct role in choices to adopt coercive laws. I say
"she might be open," because she would then face a troubling
question. Should she engage in self-exclusion regardless of the
behavior of others, or should self-exclusion be a matter of reciprocity?
We believe that the wanton infliction of harm is wrong, no matter
how others act, but we think waiting in line makes sense only if most
other people observe the same restraint. Our believer might conclude
that she should refrain from relying directly on her religious premises
only if most others are doing the same.5 I shall not explore this issue
further here, except to say that I believe reciprocity is a substantial
component of a sound principle of exclusion.
4. Or, more charitably, the far more significant evaluation must take this form.
5. She would certainly think that, if she accepted exclusion as a kind of appropriate
political compromise, preferable to losing out from the use of religious views different
from hers.
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The place of political philosophy detached from specific
comprehensive views is now more readily apparent. It tries to
identify grounds that will appeal to people with various overarching
views. I do not want to claim that it is more important than
theorizing within religious and other wide views, only that it is worth
doing.
IV. ADVOCACY AND JUDGMENT
When we think about how people make up their minds and how
they discuss issues and advocate positions, two related truths quickly
emerge. The first is that one can more easily monitor one's discourse
than one's grounds of decision. The second is that although other
people have the same access as the speaker does to the speaker's
discourse, ordinarily they have much less access to the full grounds of
decision.6 These truths have immense importance for our topic.
Most people would be hard put to try to carry out a program of
excluding their deepest religious convictions from their political
judgments. For many crucial issues, they would be incapable of
disentangling what they believe because of underlying religious
convictions from what they would believe if they somehow relied only
on premises of liberal democracy and shared techniques of under-
standing.
Speaking without reference to religious convictions is not difficult.
At Columbia Law School members of the faculty share an assumption
that law school problems are to be resolved in terms of values that
are not explicitly connected to particular comprehensive views. In my
thirty years there, I have yet to hear a specifically Jewish, Christian,
or atheist argument for one faculty decision rather than another. Yet,
when decisions involve the point of legal education, I wonder if
colleagues try rigorously to remove the threads of their religious
understandings about the nature of society and education for a
profession. I should imagine that the experience of many readers is
similar in this respect, although at law schools with powerful religious
connections, discussion of positions in explicitly religious terms may
be more common.
People can tell easily whether arguments are being made from
explicit religious premises; they will know if their own restraint is
6. However, on occasion, some other people have greater insight into a person's
motivations than does the person herself.
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matched by parallel behavior from others. If they try to purge their
silent deliberations of religious influence, they can rarely be sure that
others are similarly motivated and that others are successful. Once
a person realizes just how difficult this exercise will be to perform, he
will doubt the effort and success of others. This is a poor basis for
restraint that should be reciprocal.
V. OFFICIALS AND CITIZENS
Officials have a lot more to do with the law that gets made and
applied than do citizens; there are a lot more citizens than officials.
Officials are used to making judgments and offering reasons that do
not include everything they believe is relevant in their personal lives.
Citizens are less used to practicing such restraint. Of course, we can
conceive of a highly educated, participating citizenry in which
ordinary people learn to draw distinctions between what matters for
most aspects of life and what matters for politics. But that is not our
citizenry. For officials to practice some restraint impinges much less
on a population's religious liberty than for citizens to practice
restraint; and official restraint more greatly affects the quality of
political life. These basic differences-between advocacy and
judgment and between officials and citizens-suggest that if any self-
exclusion is justified, it is self-exclusion for officials in their public
statements. That indeed is the core of my intermediate position.
VI. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY RETAIL
I need to supply one final building block. Much of the theorizing
about this subject has been cast in terms of liberal democracies in
general. Some theorizing has been put as an elaboration of what the
Establishment Clause of our Constitution actually requires. I believe
neither of these approaches answers the most central practical
questions.
The Establishment Clause, in its direct force, has modest
implications here. It does not make reliance on religious premises
unconstitutional, when the resulting law protects interests-such as the
lives of animals-that are comprehensible in nonreligious terms, and
the law does not impose on other people's religions. When I say that
reliance is not unconstitutional, I mean not only that courts should
not hold such laws invalid, but also that these laws are not in a class
of unconstitutional events that are beyond judicial enforcement.
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Theorists of liberal democracy argue persuasively that in a liberal
society people will adopt many different comprehensive views.
Barring some extraordinary and near irresistible revelation, this
condition will not change. The history of western liberal democracies,
forged out of religious division, shows that differences in religious
views can be a source of intense conflict. But, I believe it is much too
early to conclude that this must inevitably be the condition of liberal
democracies. We can imagine people of various religious views who
seek to learn from one another and who trust each other's social
judgments. These people might welcome the injection of religious
perspectives in political discourse. They might be interested in
employing their own perspectives and in understanding the views of
others, without being fearful of coercion according to premises they
do not accept. On the other hand, one would not recommend
explicitly religious politics as the most fruitful approach for a newly
constituted Northern Ireland or for the fledgling, fragile union to be
formed in Bosnia. Much depends on history, culture, the religious
and other comprehensive views that people hold, and their degree of
mutual tolerance and respect. If I am right about this, specific
principles of self-restraint must be offered for particular political
orders, not in gross.
The United States is a country of great diversity in culture and
religion. Relevantly, the percentage of our people that is neither
Christian nor Jewish increases steadily, with immigration policies that
no longer discriminate egregiously against Asians. Outright religious
conflict is rare in the United States, but religious differences remain
a source of distrust and tension. In contrast to some Western
European countries, religious convictions are intense and widespread
enough to influence politics and to disturb people with their influence.
VII. JUDGES
Among officials, we can divide roughly between those who apply
law and those who make law or exercise ordinary discretionary
judgment. Among those who apply law, judges and quasi-judicial
officials often provide reasoned justifications for their decisions. At
this stage of United States history, one does not find explicitly
religious grounds in opinions, even when courts reach beyond
standard legal sources to comment on the social benefits or harms of
a possible ruling. By an explicitly religious ground, I mean reasoning
in this form: "Given a true religious proposition, these conclusions
about social good follow." Some examination of religious sources
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might be acceptable to show the community's attitudes toward a
practice or its deep moral assumptions, and judges might employ
familiar religious stories to illustrate a point, but none of these is a
reliance on religious grounds in the sense that I mean. Although
judicial opinions are rarely completely candid about the strength of
competing arguments, one expects judges to rely on arguments they
believe should have force for all judges. In our culture this excludes
arguments based on particular religious premises. Perhaps there are
rare cases when judges find that relevant arguments that are broadly
accepted are in equipoise; perhaps a judge may then properly rely on
some religious or personal sense to tip the balance. Even then, we
would not expect to find such reasons in an opinion, and this restraint
is desirable.
VIII. LEGISLATORS
Conventions about what legislators say and do may vary in
different parts of the country. In localities where one religion is
overwhelmingly dominant, religious discourse may not be uncommon.
I shall concentrate on Congress.
We may start with the proposition that if an explicit religious
grounding were placed in the preamble to a statute, that might be
viewed as a promotion of religion that would violate the Establish-
ment Clause. Members of Congress typically do not make religious
arguments on the floor of Congress or before their constituents.
There is, however, no accepted understanding that they should avoid
giving any weight to their own religious convictions and those of
constituents in the formulation of their positions. I believe legislators
should give greater weight to reasons that are generally available than
to those they understand are not, but some reliance on religious and
similar reasons is appropriate, especially since the generally available
reasons are radically indecisive about some crucial social problems.
I believe the present conventions about national legislators reflect a
sound accommodation of the needs of a religiously diverse citizenry
with the inclination of legislators to bring all they believe to bear on
political problems.
If I have stated present conventions with any accuracy, they help
produce less than fully candid discourse, since legislators may refrain
from arguing from premises that matter to them. Two objections to
this practice are that discourse is impoverished and voters are left less
well-informed than they might be. Realism counsels that much
legislative discourse is far from fully candid, so self-restraint about
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religious grounds is hardly a major contributor to lack of candor. In
any event, the value of self-restraint overrides this drawback and
whatever reduction in information voters suffer. Let me be clear-I
do not say legislators should deny religious bases that motivate them;
only that they should not develop public arguments in these terms.
IX. PRIVATE CITIZENS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS
Because citizens are not used to practicing self-restraint of this
kind, and because most citizens have relatively little involvement in
the political process, I do not think they should regard themselves as
constrained to avoid relying on religious grounds or to avoid stating
these grounds. Some citizens, however, such as university and
corporation presidents, and individuals consistently engaged in
political life, have a much more public role. For them, something like
the constraints for legislators is appropriate.
Religious leaders and organizations have a special place. They
do properly develop religious grounds as these relate to political
problems, and they also properly take part in direct efforts to win
support for particular positions. I think it is usually unfortunate when
religious leaders endorse parties or candidates and when people who
become officials continue to hold themselves out as religious leaders.
X. CONCLUSION
When we examine our political practices, we see that our society
has some loose, somewhat controversial, conventions about the place
of religion in political life. I think those conventions represent one
appropriate approach within a liberal democracy, and one well suited
for our society at this time. I regret that within the larger culture
there is a kind of sharp division between serious religion, which
affects many people and has a considerable influence on political life,
and the broad culture, which has become largely nonreligious. I
believe it would be healthy were there more dialogue in the broad
culture about a religious or spiritual dimension of life. What I do not
favor is a substantially increased injection of religious premises into
discussions of particular political issues.
